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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH MARKS, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
-vs.-
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, a foreign 
nrnurance company, 
Defendant - Appclla,nt. 
Case 
No.10656 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from a decision of the court which 
was on the merits after hearing all of the evidence that 
either party cared to produce. It ruled that the policy 
of insurance which the plaintiff had obtained from de-
fendant was in force at the time she received a medical 
treatment for which she seeks recovery and found that 
there was no fraud or misstatement by plaintiff with in-
tention to deceive or mislead the defendant, and further 
found tlrnt the misstatements that were contained did not 
affect the risk or materially contribute to the eventual 
condition requiring medical attention. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LO-WER COURT 
This case was tried to the court sitting without a jury 
who found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant after considering the evidence presented by 
both of the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have this court find as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is unable to agree with the statement of 
facts as contained in defendant's brief and rather than 
try and correct such statement, will restate the facts with 
the purpose in mind of giving to the court a narrative 
statement accurately presenting the evidence on which 
the trial court relied in finding in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant. 
Plaintiff and her two sons are the insureds on hvo 
policies of insurance issued by defendant with an effective 
day of May 27, 1963. The hvo policies are Exhibits P-1 
and P-2. The policies are the usual form of policy provid-
ing for coverage on medical and surgical expenses and 
plaintiff's claim is only for the actual medical and surg-i-
cal expense which was incurred. 
The policies were purchased by the plaintiff's former 
husband, Jerome Marks, father of the two children, '"hose 
names are Loren and David Marks. Exhibit D-6, a let-
ter from defendant's agent, states that these policies had 
been purchased. There was forwarded forms for plain-
tiff Ruth Marks to fill out. 
Mrs. Marks did not fill out the forms furnished to 
her, but simply signed one and returned it to the agent 
for defendant at Tulsa, Oklahoma (R. 29). She wrote a 
letter to her relative, Mr. Borofsky, with the application 
and related the various items of past medical history, in-
cluding the fact that she had an operation on her coccyx 
bone in 1954 (R. 31). Prior to the time the policy with 
defendant was purchased, plaintiff had been employed by 
the Lorraine Press for a period of twelve years and had 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield coverage there (R. 31). There 
were a few months, January, February, March and April 
and the first 27 days of May, 1963, when no coverage was 
in existence on plaintiff and her children. During the 
period of time when defendant claims the physical con-
dition affecting its policy existed, plaintiff had Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield (R. 32). When the policies of insurance 
were received they had attached to them the applications 
which had been filled in over the signature of Mrs. Marks, 
but she did not examine them closely enough to notice 
what the information contained was (R. 34). After the 
;:ipplication for insurance had been received and the poli-
cies issued, Mrs. Marks continued to work on a survey 
campaign for her ex-husband, Jerome Marks. She worked 
from about the first of May through the middle of Au-
gust, 1963, conducting a telephone survey. The work re-
quired her to start at 8 :00 o'clock in the morning and 
work until 10 :00 at night. It consisted of general office 
work, superYising 80 girls, and caring for payrolls and 
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other necessary information. It required Mrs. l\Iarks to 
be on her feet all the time. From May through August, 
1963, there were no symptoms of any kind in l\frs. Marks' 
back and no pain (R. 52). After she completed the '"·ork 
in August she went on vacation and did not work. A few 
days before Thanksgiving, in the nighttime, she awoke 
unable to move her right leg and right hip and the side of 
her face was numb. She was afraid that something was 
wrong in her right leg, but disregarded the conditioll:s 
and went on a trip to visit her family in California with-
out seeking medical attention. While there her mothrr 
suggested that she obtain medical attention (R. 53). Sbr 
did not see a doctor and the pain in her back was inter-
mittent during December and January of 1963. Prior to 
November, 1963, other than back strain type of pain re-
sulting from extra work, Mrs. Marks had no backache 
similar in kind to the pain she suffered after ThanksgiY-
ing of 1963. She saw the first doctor relating to her back-
ache in January, 1964, when she consulted Dr. Karavitis, 
a neurosurgeon (R. 55). Dr. Kara vi tis recommended 
that she see Dr. Lamb. The operation was performed in 
April, 1964 on Mrs. Marks' hack. 
Mrs. Marks testified that the pain in her right le~~, 
for which she was operated, had not been present in Jn1y, 
1955, when she consulted Dr. Lamh. This was a pain in 
the left leg and primarily in the coccyx area of her lmt-
tocks where she had had her coccyx hone removed ( R. FiG). 
Dr. Robert Lamb testified on behalf of defendant. 
His examination of Mrs. Marks at the time of the opera-
tion revealed that she had a protrnding hnt not a rup-
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tured disc. (Lamb Depo. P. 13.) His record revealed that 
on i\f arch 11, 1964, Mrs. l\farks stated that her chief com-
plaint was pain in the low back and right leg which had 
been present for some few weeks and was getting worse. 
(Lamb Depo. P. 15.) Counsel for defendant asked Dr. 
Lnmh to assume that if plaintiff had intermittent pain for 
nine years, whether or not the operation in April, 1964, 
\ms connected to the early condition observed in 1955 by 
Dr. Chapman. The doctor stated that he would be of tlw 
opinion that it resulted from the trauma she sustained 
in February, 1955, but further stated that the continued 
symptoms since the time in 1955 and that reoccurring in-
termittent symptoms were the important connecting link. 
(Lamb Depo. P. 9.) The doctor further testified that as 
long as the disc which he removed protruded and applied 
pressure on the nerve, the person would receive pain. 
(Lamb Depo. P. 11) and that the pain and the pressure 
were related as cause and effect. Dr. Lamb stated that 
the coccygectomy was in no way related to the ultimate 
operi'ltion for the bulging disc. (Lamb Depo. P. 11.) When 
counsel for defendant asked Dr. Lamb to assume that 
1\Irs. Marks had had intemittent back pain during the full 
nine years between 1955 and 1964, the assumption was 
denied as being a true state of facts by counsel for plain-
tiff (Lamb Depo. P. 19-20), and the doctor made the 
following answer after counsel for defendant's questions: 
''Assuming these facts that yon h:we related to 
me, I think 0112 has to sn~T that the injury that she 
had did pla~T some part in the intermittent, con-
tinued intermittent pain that she had which even-
tnall~T rcqnirecl surgenT, if this patient had no pain 
of thi8 type prior to i11jury or assuming this pa-
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tient had no pain of this type prior to injury.'' 
(Lamb Depo. P. 20.) 
Counsel for plaintiff asked the doctor to assume that 
the pain in the back had not been intermittent, but that 
she had had a pain-free back between 1955 and until a few 
weeks before March, 1964, what effect this as~mmption 
would have on his opinion and the doctor then answered 
as follows: 
'' vV ell, I certainly wouldn't be sure - had the 
patient had a period of symptom free period for 
several years I wouldn't be sure what part the in-
jury played on the eventual disc protrusion, 
whether it was severe enough to set up a degenera-
tive process it might have in some way influenced 
the eventual protrusion or whether it was inconse-
qential." (Lamb Depo. P. 20-21.) 
(Q) "I suppose it would be true, would it not, Dr. 
Lamb, that the longer the period of pain free back, 
the less likelihood that the original injury caused 
the final protrusion or the smaller the effect of the 
original injury on the final protrusion?'' 
(A) "Yes, I think this is true." 
The evidence from Mrs. Marks was that she did have 
a long period of pain-free back from 1955 to 1963. During 
this period of time she worked hard, had an automobile 
accident which affected the nerve in her elbow, but dirl 
not have any reoccurrence of the back pain in the area of 
the coccyx or left leg. The pain which came on in No-
vember, 1963, was in her right leg. She has hacl no fur-
ther symptoms even to the present time relating- to pain 
in the left leg. 
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The information contained in the application for in-
surance was actually placed on the application by the 
Magoon Agency and possibly by Mr. Borof sky, who was 
a relative of the plaintiff. The necessary information 
'ms furnished to Mr. Borof sky by letter, telephone con-
versations, as well as through his familiarity with plain-
tiff's family and her physical condition (R. 43-44). The 
general agent for defendant testified that 99% of the ap-
plications such as were submitted in this case are :filled in 
by the insurance company agent. The information is ob-
tained from the person applying for insurance and put 
on the application by the agent. It is the duty of the 
agent to obtain the information as accurately as possible 
and to fill in the application as accurately as possible, in-
terpreting the same on behalf of his insurance company. 
(See deposition of Harry B. Magoon.) 
The trial court found that the application was filled 
in by the agents of Continental Casualty Company, was 
based on information which the plaintiff had furnished to 
him, both from personal acquaintance and correspond-
ence and telephone calls, found that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the plaintiff or any of the agents of 
Magoon and Associates to deceive or defraud the de-
fendant, that all parties engaged or taking part in the 
preparation of the application believed the information 
thereon contained was accurate and correct. 
Court found in accordance with the evidence of plain-
tiff that the pain in her left leg, which she had suffered in 
1055, was not the pain which she suffered in the right 
lrg in 1963, that her condition for which she was ulti-
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mately operated on commenced more than thirty day:; 
after the 27th of l\fay, 1963. rrhe court further fon11cl tlint 
the fall in 1955 and the automobile aceitlc11t in 1!l::i7 1\·ere 
in no way related to the conditioll which y)lai11tiff wac; 
operated on for on April 3, 1964, nor dicl these incidents 
increase the hazard for ~which the defendant issnrd its 
policies to plaintiff and the minor children. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE. 
The evidence substantially supports each firnli112: ilrnt 
the trial court made. One of the places ~where there is 
confusion and some evidence on lwth sides of a basic 
question relates to the history of the plaintiff's condition 
as contained in the medical record. Dr. Laml1's reconl 
dated March 11, 1964, under" History" states as follows: 
"This patient states that she has had some sore-
ness in her low back and right hip for some fow 
weeks and it is getting 1vorse." (F,xhihit D-8) 
On the hospital record under the initial PI there is writ-
ten, "nine years PTA this patient had a severe fall, land-
ing on her huttocks. Since that time she has 11ml inter-
mittent lffw back pain, sometimes so seYere that she <''1 11 "t 
get out of heel. She has had pain in the right hip am! 
paresthenas down the entire right leg for past 41 :: 
months." (Exhibit 1) J\Irs. l\Iarks denied tlrnt the iwrso11 
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maki11g the note on the hospital record had correctly in-
terpreted what she hacl told. The intermittent low hack 
pain had only be0n since November and \Vas the problem 
for 4% months prior to the operation rather than nine 
years. This statl>ment is consistent with the history as 
contained in Dr. Lamb's office records. Both records 
were made before the claim which the plaintiff makes 
arose. 
The trial court chose to believe Mrs. :Marks and to 
accept Dr. Lamb's office record ·where it was in conflict 
with the statement on the hospital record. It is respect-
fully suhmittecl that this determinaion by the trial court 
on a disputed question of fact is entirely proper and sup-
ported hy substantial evidence. 
Defendant seeks to def end the claim of plaintiff on 
the ground that the insurance policy was obtained by 
fraudulent representations relating to the plaintiff's 
physical condition and past medical history. The court 
fournl that the1·e was no intention on the part of any of 
tl1c parties ·who ·were involved in the preparation of the 
application to deceive or defraud the defendant, that the 
p:nties answered the questions with information thc.'' hc-
1 ievecl \YRS aceura te and correct. This finding is snn-
portecl hy snhstantial evidence and no substantial con-
trar.'' e\'iclcnce is presented. 
Defendant cites the two accidents tlrnt the plaintiff 
had hacl as lieing i11 some way material, bnt the t0stimo11y 
of D1·. Lamb was that the coccygectomy "\Yas in no way a 
factor i11 the ultimate com1ition for which he operated 
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on Mrs. l\Iarks in April, 1064. The accident i11 ·which she 
had had the nerve in her arm injured was likewise im-
material. Her condition in 1964 ·was in no way the result 
of, nor was the condition contributed to bv either one of 
these accidents. 
An ordinary individual, it is respectfully submitted, 
would not consider that these accidents created a disor-
der or disease or were items which would in any way 
increase the risk or hazard to the insurance company. 
Apparently this conclusion was one \Yhich the insurance 
agent himself came to since he was aware of the history 
of his uncle's former wife at the time the application 
was filled out. The end result was that these items did 
not in any way contribute to plaintiff's physical disa-
bility which created the claim. No questions were asked 
concerning accidental injury. Plaintiff had suffered two 
accidents in her lifetime, in 1954 and 1957. Neither, as 
far as she knew, left her with any disorders. None of 
the treatments or hospitalizations had occurred within 
five years from date of application so the ans·wer to 
question 11 is in no way inaccurate. 
The burden of proof that plaintiff engaged in fraud-
ulent conduct in the procurement of the insurance pol-
icy would rest upon the defendant, and it is respectfu11y 
submitted that there is not only not substantial proof of 
such conduct on the part of the plaintiff, hut then" is no 
evidence of any kind that would support such a finding 
by the trial court. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S 1CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
UTAH LAW. 
This court in a very carefully considered opm1on, 
Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 
16 Utah 2nd 52, 395 P. 2d 724, set down the rule which 
plaintiff believes is determinative of this appeal. The 
trial court followed it in granting plaintiff judgment. 
'rhere, as here, the insurance company sought to avoid 
liability and the payment of a claim by alleging misrep-
resentations in the negotiation of the insurance policy. 
The court held: 
"Unless the misrepresentations in the negotiation 
for an insurance policy are made with the intent 
to deceive and 'materially affected either the ac-
ceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the 
insurer' the insurance contract cannot be avoided 
by an insurance company. Mere falsity of an-
swers to questions propounded are insufficient if 
not knowingly made with intent to deceive and 
defraud." 
rrhe TV ootton decision was based on two applicable 
sources of law. Sec. 31-19-8, U.C.A. 1953 and prior de-
cided cases. 
Plaintiff agrees with the defendant's statement that 
Section 31-19-8, U.C.A. 1953 is the applicable statute of 
State of Utah and also agrees that she has the burden 
to prove that she did not intend to deceive the insurance 
company. 
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31-19-8, U.C.A. provides that no misrepresentati011 
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the colltrad 
unless the misrepresentation was made with the intent 
to deceive. The testimony of plaintiff was that slw 
did not believe any of the representations were false or 
that at the time she made the answers to the ag-e11t relating 
to hers and her children's medical history there was any 
misrepresentations. True, she had snffered two aeeiclell-
tal injuries from which she belie;-t'cl she ha(l fnll~T reeov-
erd and which injuries, on the 15th of l\Ia~-, 1063, ).f rs. 
Marks did not belie\-e had caused her any disorders. 
Question 11 on the application seems to set the tone 
of the other prior questions in that it asks a general qurs-
tion, ''Have you or any dependent named had medical or 
surgical advice or treatment or been hospital confined 
during the past five years other than stated above?" 
The injuries that 1\frs. l\f arks had received, the hos-
pitalization, surgical advice, had all been more than fin' 
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years before the 15th of May, 1963. This qncstion ;ms 
answered "no" and correctl~r so. 
To the hest of l\[rs. l\Iark'l knowledge the other an-
swer to question lOF was roned. She believed that the 
accidental injuries which she had recei Hcl would 11ot lw 
classified as ''arthritis, rhenmatism, hack, spine, hone, 
joint, or muscle disorder.'' 
The normal interpretation of this qnestio11 10 F 
would he set hv the first ·words of the question, "arthrit-
is, rheumatism," or some otlwr clisease of t hr back, arnl 
thr aecidental injuries that l\Irs. Marke; hacl rrccin•tl 
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would not be such items or disorders. It was her posi-
tion that the application was answered honestly. 
There is some indication that the defendant claims 
that the claim of Mrs. Marks for workman's compensa-
tion made as a result of her accidental injury on Decem-
her 6, 1957, would in some way have been material and 
that the failure to disclose this accident would have af-
fected the insurable risk undertaken by defendant. 
This was an accident in which plaintiff's left arm 
was injured and she had a nerve paralysis in the arm re-
sulting from a puncture wound. As in the case of the 
coccyx removal, this injury had no bearing whatsoever 
on the ultimate protrusion of her intervertebral disc 
causing nerve pressure and even though its concealment 
were found to be fraudulent and intentional, it would be 
immaterial. 
The early Utah case of Chadwick v. Beneficial J,ife 
fosurance Company, 54 Utah 443, 181 P. 448, involved 
the issuance of a policy of insurance to an insured who 
believed he had rheumatism. His pain had been diag-
Hosed by his attending physician as rheumatism. It was 
eventually discovered to be tuberculosis of the spine and 
was the actual cause of his death. This court there held 
for a misrepresentation in the negotiation of an insur-
ance contract to be the basis of avoiding the policy, it 
must have been made ·with the intention to decei\'e. 
Plaintiff elaims that none of the misrepresentations, 
if such there were, could be material. Dr. Lamb dearly 
testified that the cocc~'X operation did not in any way 
contribute to Mrs. Marks' protruding disc. Certainly it 
could not be claimed that the prior automobile accident 
which caused the nerve involvement in her arm con-
tributed to her bulging intervertebral disc. 
At the time of trial defendant didn't make any such 
claim, and it is quite obvious that the condition for 
which Mrs. Marks was operated was not the kind of 
condition that she had following her accident imme-
diately after the coccyx operation. There the pain was 
in the left leg and the root-nerve pressure which started 
in November, 1963, was in the right leg. These condi-
tions cannot be the same, pressure on the nerve is the 
pain producing factor, and when the pressure is released 
the pain subsides. 
An early Utah case following Chadwick v. Beneficial 
Life Insura;nce Company (supra) is New York Life In-
surance Company v. Grow, 103 Utah 285, 135 P. 2d, 120. 
In this instance a material misrepresentation was con-
tained in the application. The representation related 
to whether or not the insured had heart trouble. The 
insured had had a heart attack, which was so diagnosed 
and for which he had been treated. It was the result of 
an accident and over-exertion in an attempt to escape 
from an earth cavein. The insured had related to 
the agent for the insurance company the fact of 
the accident. The agent denied that he considered 
it important or realized that it was an injury whirh 
created a heart condition. The trial court fonrnl 
that the insured did not intend to deceive the insur-
ance company since he had mentioned the accide11t 
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and the interpretation placed on his statement by the 
insurance company's agent was not the responsibility of 
the insured. Recovery was sustained on behalf of the 
beneficiary of the insured. In the case now before the 
court, a similar situation exists. Mrs. Marks revealed 
to her ex-husband's nephew the information relating to 
her physical condition and in addition, he was closely 
associated with her family during the time when the 
various accidents happened and the resultant treatments 
received. His translation and interpretation of this in-
formation certainly could not be held to be the plaintiff's 
responsibility. There was no evidence that the agent had 
any intention to deceive his employer. In the absence of 
evidence of that kind of conduct on his part, it must be 
presumed that he acted in good faith. 
In Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
108 F. 2d 902, 10 CCA, there were several misstatements 
about the insured 's employment, place of residence, 
length of time at residence, length of time he had been 
employed in a grocery store, his occupation for the past 
five years, but these misrepresentations were found by 
the jury not to have been made with the intention to de-
ceive or defraud the insurance company. The insurance 
company's agent, one Cayias, had known the insured 
Orfanis, knew that he did not live at his place of employ-
ment in the grocery store, and knew of his general habits 
at the time the application was taken and the policy of 
insurance delivered. The Circuit Court affirmed the jury 
\'erdict for the insured and stated the law of Utah based 
on the Chadwick v. Beneficial Life case, i.e. that misrep-
resentations, even of material facts, would not void an 
insurance policy unless it was 0stablishecl that they were 
kno-wingly made with intent to deceive and defraud. 
An additional case has been up to the Tenth Cir-
cuit recently where the information furnished to the in-
surance agent did not find its way on to the applicatio11 
·which he filled out and had the insured sign. This casr 
is Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Willsey, 
214 F. 2d 729, 10 CCA. In this case the insured advised 
the agent of a past history of being hit on the head in a 
baseball p.;ame and of having had dizzy spells. The agent 
said unless there had been some recc>nt trouble from this, 
it was immaterial and did not reveal this particular prob-
lem on the applicatiou. The insured died in the l1ath-
room with a bruise on his head and water in his lungs. 
Death, it ·was found, was accidental. Even thou!;?,"h the 
agent had no authority to vary the terms of the policy, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the 7,n-
lintakis ruling relating to Utah law and held that undrr 
Utah law no misrepresentation could defeat or avoid a 
policy of insurance unless made ·with intent to deceiw 
and there could be no intention to deceive where the past 
history was revealed to the insurance company's agent. 
The agent, in translation of the answers and interpretin.g 
them for the purpose of the application, would insulate 
the insured against any claim by the company that he 
intended to deceive the company and had failed to reveal 
his medical history. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if any misreprr-
sentations are containeel in the application of insuranrr, 
they are on immaterial matters aml ·were not made ·with 
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any intent to deceive and the mere falsity of the answers 
are insufficient to justify avoidance of the insurance pol-
icy by defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's dis-
position of the present matter is proper, that the find-
ings of fact are supported by evidence of a substantial 
nature, and the legal principles have been correctly ap-
plied. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this -------------------------------- day of 
--- --- -- ---- ---- -------- -- -- ------------ ---- -- --.. , 1966. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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